misrepresentation and fraud are declared unlawful, and the attorney general is empowered to seek injunctions to restrain unlawful practices; the Massachusetts statute, on the other hand, is directed only at false advertising. But such legislation has provided meager protection for the defrauded consumer due to the limited scope of administration and enforcement.7
The response of the legal profession has been to provide group legal services 8 and to establish neighborhood legal services. 9 Nevertheless, it seems clear that such legal services will not be able to deal with the 7 Results in Illinois indicate that the act has little deterrent effect. Upon receiving a complaint, a letter of inquiry is sent to the merchant. Most complaints are disposed of by the merchant's reply that he will release the buyer from the contract. Interview with Member of Consumer Fraud Bureau, Illinois Attorney General's Office, Chicago, Ill., Nov. 4, 1965. Since satisfaction of the complaint halts the process, the merchant can buy his peace cheaply and the statute has little influence on business practice. Because more than ninety per cent of the New York Frauds Bureau's activity is devoted to mediating individual buyer and seller disagreements, its efforts are apparently achieving equally limited deterrent effect. Comment, supra note 5, 114 U. PA. L. Rlv. at 480.
The problem will not be solved, however, by more active prosecution by the bureaus since they will not be in a position to respond to an illegal course of dealing by merchants in local neighborhoods without vast expansion of their resources and manpower. Because local consumer problems and the need for injunctive relief are apparent to local legal aid offices, a theory for private locally initiated relief sought through the resources of expanded legal services would be of significant utility. as they are inadequately controlled by existing legal remedies, they constitute what might be termed a commercial nuisance. Although the remedy would be derived not from consumer fraud legislation" but from the common law of nuisance, plaintiffs would in effect be suing as "private attorneys general"' 12 to prevent fraudulent practices which are not now deterred by private litigation or the public enforcement of consumer fraud legislation. For example, if a local merchant sells reconditioned television sets as new, a buyer might initiate a suit in his name or on behalf of all those similarly situated, supported by affidavits from others who were affected by this business practice. Upon finding that the activity did constitute a nuisance, the court would enjoin any further fraud by substitution of items for those described in the contract. If the activity is in violation of a statute, an injunction might issue to enjoin its future violation.
13 Such a suit would not preclude the traditional defenses against enforcement of the contract or a suit to rescind but rather would be an apt supplement to such relief, since damages for past conduct are generally insufficient to protect future customers from injury. For centuries the law of nuisance has provided injunctive relief from individual activity causing harm not justified by its social utility. While private nuisance prevented interferences witfi the use of private land, public nuisance developed to include an act or omission "which obstructs or causes inconvenience to the public in exercise of rights common to all her Majesty's subjects."' 4 Public nuisance has traditionally been applied to protect a variety of public interests including health, 1 5 morality,' 6 safety,' 7 and convenience.' 8 In this century it has also been applied to commercial transactions which violate usury laws.
In the leading commercial nuisance case, State ex rel. Smith v. McMahon,' 9 the Kansas Supreme Court held that the attorney general could bring suit to enjoin two defendants from violation of noncriminal usury statutes and to have a receiver appointed to wind up outstanding usurious loans. The crucial fact, in the court's view, was that the statute prohibiting usury furnished "no practical relief" 20 because it provided no criminal penalties and borrowers did not dare assert their civil remedies for fear that garnishment of their wages by creditors would result in their being fired. The states's cause of action has become regarded as settled law in Kansas.
2 ' Several other states have followed McMahon and have enjoined continuous violations of their usury statutes. 22 In each case, courts [Vol. 33:590 found that because the public policy against usury was inadequately enforced, either by individual actions taken one by one or by criminal prosecutions, a nuisance existed and future violations of the statute were enjoined.
Commercial fraud presents much the same justification for finding an enjoinable nuisance. 23 The central problem is to define the elements which indicate that relief is inadequate. Since this is the same problem faced by the several state courts which have considered the usurynuisance cases, analysis of the factors considered significant there should prove helpful in developing the doctrine of commercial nuisance. , a habeas corpus proceeding, in which petitioner, a defendant in the state's suit for an injunction, had been jailed for contempt when he refused to present his subpoenaed business records. He contended that in a suit by the state a court of equity had no jurisdiction to enjoin the violation of a statute which only created private rights in the victims, since the state had no property right in the case. He further argued that inadequacy of enforcement was strictly a legislative concern and that judicial imposition of penalties went beyond the court's jurisdiction. His writ was granted. In response to this case the Texas legislature enacted a statute giving the attorney general power to bring such suits. T. (1930) , which is frequently cited for the proposition that criminal usury is not an enjoinable nuisance but which in fact was decided on a pleading point. 23 To suggest that the concept of commercial nuisance which developed under the usury statutes should be extended to include illegal business practices is not to argue that usury statutes be extended to cover installment contracts. It is generally settled that price increases on installment sales will not be considered interest under the usury statutes. Nevertheless, the assumption underlying that doctrine, which was that whereas borrowers are often driven to the mercies of lenders by necessity, purchasers on credit are capable of rational economic decisions and choices, CURRaN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1-4, is challenged by recent studies of purchasing habits in areas of urban poverty, see CAPLOVITZ, op. cit. supra note 1, at 13.
Only Arkansas and Nebraska apply usury ceilings to installment contracts. See CURRAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 83-90. In some jurisdictions, courts have held that a purported sales contract was in fact a loan and subject to the usury statutes when executed by a vendor and buyer with the assistance, advice, and knowledge of a third party finance company who then bought -the contract from the vendor at a discount. Beatty v. Franklin Inv. Most of the usury cases turned in part on the poverty of the borrowers and their consequent inability to retain a lawyer to assert their defenses. 24 A second major factor given recognition was that the small amounts at stake discouraged litigation whether or not the buyers were poor. 2 5 Third, the courts of equity perceived that buyers might fail to initiate suits for such noneconomic reasons as ignorance of their legal rights 26 or fear of reprisals by local creditors. 27 The characteristic common to each of these elements is the discouragement of litigation necessary to control practices which are against public policy; each element is relevant to fradulent or illegal commercial practices as well as to usury. A different set of problems arises when the commercial activity involves criminal sanctions because of the traditional rule that equity will not enjoin a crime. 28 
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nuisance in spite of the criminal nature of the activity. 31 These cases distinguish between the single violation which would constitute a crime and repeated violations which, in some circumstances, would not only be a series of crimes but a nuisance as well. 32 Accordingly, while no court has held that violation of the usury statutes is itself a nuisance, courts have considered such factors as harm to public welfare 33 the number and feasibility 'of criminal actions required to protect borTowers, 34 and the poverty of borrowers and their fear of initiating criminal actions against their creditors 35 in determining that criminal activity is a nuisance.
If the elements accorded importance in the usury cases occur in the comparable commercial context of retail sales transactions, there would exist ample precedent for relying on the nuisance concept. A further consideration recognized in the usury area is common also to commercial transactions: if courts often become parties to unscrupulous practices by enforcing uncontested default judgments, by issuing writs of garnishment, and by enforcing confessions of judgments, the image of their integrity may be undermined. 6 In light of the courts' own interest and the strong equitable considerations favoring preventive relief in the absence of effective alternative regulation, it would seem that the intervention of equity is not inappropriate. Even if a merchant's activity seems to constitute a public nuisance calling for the intervention of equity, there remain difficult procedural problems before a suit can be successfully maintained by aggrieved individuals. General nuisance theory is clear in giving the state standing to enjoin a public nuisance. 3 7 Thus, as the usury cases suggest, the state may sue on a nuisance theory to protect its citizens from the injury occasioned by consumer fraud even in the absence of consumer fraud legislation. Although such a common law remedy may be helpful to the state in a jurisdiction where statutory provisions for injunctive relief are limited, it is a premise of this comment that private litigation would be more responsive to consumer fraud situations. 38 But when aggrieved individuals initiate a commercial nuisance suit, problems of standing arise in addition to the perennial equitable question of the scope of the injunction. Although a corollary to the public nuisance concept declares a nuisance to be abatable only by public prosecution, a variety of technical formulas has been devised to grant a private party standing. 
368, 14 N.E.2d 439 (1938).
38 One potential source of consumer protection is afforded by the cause of action which a merchant may bring to enjoin unlawful competition. This line of cases is not based on nuisance but rather seeks to protect the property interest which a merchant is deemed to have in his lawfully operated business. Not only have courts been willing to consider lawful business as a property right, but they have also been exceedingly liberal with the quantum of evidence required to prove damage. In Featherstone v. Independent Serv. Station Assn. of Texas, 10 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928), an injunction was granted against the defendants' illegal lottery. The only evidence of damage was the plaintiff's testimony that customers had left his service station when they discovered that he did not give away lottery tickets. The most useful formula for a commercial nuisance suit involves a broad exception to the public nuisance standing rule permitting a private citizen to sue to abate a public nuisance if he suffers "special damages." Usually special damages has meant damages different in degree and kind from those suffered by the public at large. 40 But some courts have viewed this requirement for standing as too strict, and on occasion have even rephrased the "well known exception" to read: "If the proper public official refuses to take action to abate a public nuisance, then any person having an interest in the problem greater than that of the community at large may institute proceedings to abate the public nuisance." 4 1 Such a construction of the special damages rule confers standing to sue for damage to nonproperty interests. Thus, a woman has sued to enjoin obscene language directed at her, 42 and parishioners have sued to enjoin the operation of a nearby liquor store which disturbed their church worship. (1947) . The original justification for the rule that only the state could sue for a public nuisance was twofold. First, public nuisance developed as a criminal offense over which civil courts could have no jurisdiction. Second, there was a feeling that an individual should not have a cause of action for damages which he shared with the public since a multiplicity of actions would then be possible. See Mayor and Council of Alpine v. Brewster, 7 NJ. 42, 80 A.2d 297 (1951). Nevertheless, when parties before the court show more than nominal damages or when they seek an injunction, courts have used the special damage exception and others to find standing. When the injury is to land, courts find an element of private nuisance within the larger public nuisance. Mayor of Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 37 U.S. 2d 528 (1962) . These exceptions, considered with the "special damages" exception discussed above, probably indicate that the rule itself has been undermined and should be restated to allow any party showing actual In some jurisdictions, then, standing can be shown by establishing that the victims complaining of the activity have suffered "directly" or "in greater degree" than the public. 44 Even in jurisdictions which adhere to the stricter requirement that the damage suffered by the plaintiffs must be clearly distinguishable from that suffered by the community at large, it could be maintained that since the harm to the community which may result from damage to future buyers and loss of public faith in the courts is different in degree and kind from the actual loss suffered by the named plaintiffs from garnishment, attachment, or substitution of low quality goods, the standing requirement is satisfied. If proof of special damages gives private individuals standing to sue, the nuisance suit offers special procedural advantages because affidavits or testimony from other victims of the same activity may be introduced to prove that the nuisance is in fact a public one and that there has been damage. 45 Although indigent consumers are usually reluctant to bring actions or even to appear in court, they may well find safety in numbers and security in a community suit against a common nemesis. Since it would clearly be unfair to term a business practice a public nuisance on the basis of one illegal contract, the number of affidavits must be sufficient to convince the court that the activity represents a course of dealing. 46 In making such a determination, the court might properly take judicial notice of the reluctance or inability of the victims to exercise their legal rights. For proof of damages, buyers' testimony may indicate that there has been damage to a sufficient number of past and future buyers to constitute "the aggregation of private injuries . . . so ... extensive as to constitute a. . . wrong against the community," thus meriting relief under one version of the public nuisance concept.
nuisance is damaging the community as well as the individual victims. 48 In the typical nuisance case, an action by an individual or class has the same result as a suit on behalf of the state because the injunction obtained by the named plaintiff forces cessation or modification of the activity in general. Thus, if an individual brings an action to enjoin an activity producing noise, smell, or dust, abatement for the named plaintiff results in abatement for the public as well. Commercial nuisance, however, differs from previous nuisance cases in that an injunction issued for the benefit of the named plaintiff will not eliminate the source. The nuisance may be continued against the world while abated as to the plaintiff.
Since the previous case law arose from situations where granting the injunction to the individual also abated the public nuisance, there exists little authority on whether the scope of an injunction can be expanded to protect persons other than the plaintiff if a nuisance is adjudged public in nature. One court's view of the special damage exception was that courts of equity exercised jurisdiction "not for the purpose of suppressing a public nuisance, buf to redress a private wrong done to the individual." 49 The Supreme Court, however, has taken the opposite view. In Mississippi & Missouri R.R. v. Ward, 50 an 1862 case, a part owner of a Mississippi riverboat brought an action to abate the public nuisance of a railroad bridge across the river. Although the bill was dismissed on other grounds, the Court discussed the position of the specially damaged plaintiff:
A bill in equity to abate a public nuisance, filed by one who has sustained special damages, has succeeded to the former mode in England of an information in Chancery, prosecuted on behalf of the Crown, to abate or enjoin the nuisance as a preventive remedy. The private party sues rather as a public prosecutor than on his own account .... He seeks redress of a continuing trespass and wrong against himself, and acts in behalf of all others, who are or may be injured .... [Vol. 33:590
Commercial Nuisance A subsequent federal court decision supported this view and offered the additional rationale that relief is granted in special damage cases "not solely because the nuisance is private so far as [the plaintiff] is concerned, but because it is public, and the relief will benefit the public.
52
Although the language of the federal courts appears to permit injunctions of broad scope, no court has directly faced the problem. In all previous nuisance cases protection of the specially damaged plaintiff has adequately protected the public as well. One early case, however, does indicate that courts will frame relief to protect the public interest even if that requires a broader inunction than protecting the named plaintiff would require. In that case, the Court of Appeals of Colorado held that a pig farm was a nuisance both to the public and to the named plaintiff, an adjoining landowner. Hence the trial court's order, which enjoined only activity which would be offensive to the plaintiff, was expanded by the reviewing court to forbid the use of the defendant's property "in such manner as will be offensive or dangerous to the health of the plaintiff and the public."
53
If such an approach were generally accepted, or if courts accepted the dictum of the Ward case, a specially damaged plaintiff might be allowed to abate a public nuisance in its entirety through a commercial nuisance suit. Such a conclusion is further supported by the fact that protection of consumers from fraudulent sales practices would be a significant "social benefit," which constitutes a relevant factor in determining the scope of injunctions for nuisance 54 and of equity protection in general. 55 The content and form of the injunction pose additional problems. -The injunction would of course proscribe such activity as had been found to be a nuisance. But to prevent the merchant from avoiding the injunction by slight modification of his contracts, the injunction must reach conduct of "similar effect." 56 Thus, the merchant who delivers reconditioned television sets after representing them as new would be enjoined from selling goods of different quality from those described in the contract. Finally, as previously noted, if conduct is in violation 
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of a statute, the injunction would be cast in its terms. 57 Thus, effective enforcement of legislation already enacted may be the most significant function of the commercial nuisance suit.
III. CONCLUSION
The legal system currently offers inadequate redress for many of the urban poor who are injured by unscrupulous commercial practices. Few victims exercise their legal rights due to the small stakes in litigation, their financial inability to retain counsel, and their lack of comprehension of commercial and legal institutions. As a result, those who do complain and seek redress should be allowed to serve as representatives of their community. The concept of commercial nuisance offers a possible theory for such actions. Because only fraudulent, unconscionable, or illegal business practices could be enjoined, the doctrine need not threaten the legitimate businessman, and it offers at least a partial solution to the problem of inadequate legal representation of the poor. 
